/ 
Authen-WebAuthn-0.002
River stage zero No dependents
/ Authen::WebAuthn

NAME

Authen::WebAuthn - A library to add Web Authentication support to server applications

VERSION

version 0.002

SYNOPSIS

This module lets you validate Web Authentication registration and authentication responses.

Currently, it does not handle the generation of registration and authentication requests.

The transmission of requests and responses from the application server to the user's browser, and interaction with the WebAuthn browser API is also out of scope and could be handled by a dedicated JS library.

To register a new device:

# Obtain registration response from web browser
# Then,
my $webauthn_rp = Authen::WebAuthn->new(
    rp_id  => "app.example.com",
    origin => "https://app.example.com"
);

my $registration_result = eval {
    $webauthn_rp->validate_registration(
        challenge_b64          => ... ,
        requested_uv           => ... ,
        client_data_json_b64   => ... ,
        attestation_object_b64 => ... ,
        token_binding_id_b64   => ... ,
    )
};
if ($@) {
    die "Error validating registration: $@";
}

To authenticate a user:

# Obtain authentication response from web browser
# Then,
my $webauthn_rp = Authen::WebAuthn->new(
    rp_id  => "app.example.com",
    origin => "https://app.example.com"
);

my $validation_result = eval {
    $webauthn_rp->validate_assertion(
        challenge_b64          => ...,
        credential_pubkey_b64  => ...,
        stored_sign_count      => ...,
        requested_uv           => ...,
        client_data_json_b64   => ...,
        authenticator_data_b64 => ...,
        signature_b64          => ...,
        extension_results      => ...,
        token_binding_id_b64   => ...,
        trust_anchors          => ...,
    )
};
if ($@) {
    die "Error validating authentication: $@";
}

ATTRIBUTES

rp_id

The identifier of your Relying Party. Usually, this is set to the domain name over which your application is accessed (app.example.com).

origin

The origin, as defined by the HTML standard, that your Relying Party is expecting to find in registration or authentication responses. This must contain the scheme and port of your application, but no path (http://app.example.com:8080 or https://app.example.com)

METHODS

validate_registration

This method validates the registration response emitted by the authenticator.

It takes the following named arguments

challenge_b64

The base64url-encoded challenge that was submitted to the authenticator

requested_uv

Whether or not the Relying Party required user verification for this operation. Possible values are required, preferred, discouraged.

client_data_json_b64

The base64url-encoded client data received from the authenticator

attestation_object_b64

The base64url-encoded attestation object received from the authenticator

token_binding_id_b64

The base64url-encoded Token Binding ID for the current connection. Usually this comes from a Sec-Provided-Token-Binding-ID HTTP header. If you are not using Token Binding, you can omit this parameter.

trust_anchors

If the authenticator response contains an attestation, validate_registration will attempt to chain it to a trusted root certificate. You need to explicitely specify which certificates to trust if your authenticator provides an attestation.

If you requested "none" as an attestation format while initiating the registration flow, there is no need to provide any trust anchors.

This optional parameter can either be an arrayref of strings representing PEM-encoded certificates, or a subref which returns a arrayref of PEM-encoded certificates:

sub {
    my (%params) = @_;
    my $aaguid = $params{'aaguid'};
    my $attestation_type = $params{'attestation_type'};
    my $attestation_format = $params{'attestation_format'};
    ...
    return [ $pem1, $pem2, ...];
}
allowed_attestation_types

If you want to restrict the allowed attestation types, you can pass an arrayref of strings as the allowed_attestation_types parameter.

Currently supported values are None,Self,Basic

By default, all attestation types are allowed

This method croaks on errors. If the registration was successful, it returns a hashref with the following subkeys:

credential_id

The base64url-encoded credential ID for this authenticator

credential_pubkey

The base64url-encoded public key for this authenticator, in COSE format

signature_count

The initial signature count of this authenticator

This information is supposed to be persisted in the Relying Party, usually in some sort of database

The following keys are also returned:

attestation_result

Contains information about the result of the attestation validation

type

The type of attestation used by the authenticator: None, Self, Basic, ...

trust_path

An arrayref of DER-encoded certificates provided by the authenticator

aaguid

The verified AAGUID of the authenticator, this is only provided if the attestation was verified successfully

validate_assertion

This method validates the registration response emitted by the authenticator.

It takes the following named arguments

challenge_b64

The base64url-encoded challenge that was submitted to the authenticator

credential_pubkey_b64

The base64url-encoded credential public key corresponding to the received Credential ID

stored_sign_count

The current signature count in the Relying Party's database. Set it to 0 to disable verification of the signature count

requested_uv

Whether or not the Relying Party required user verification for this operation. Possible values are required, preferred, discouraged.

client_data_json_b64

The base64url-encoded client data received from the authenticator

authenticator_data_b64

The base64url-encoded authenticator data received from the authenticator

signature_b64

The base64url-encoded signature received from the authenticator

extension_results

A hashref containing extension results received from the authenticator

token_binding_id_b64

The base64url-encoded Token Binding ID for the current connection. Usually this comes from a Sec-Provided-Token-Binding-ID HTTP header. If you are not using Token Binding, you can omit this parameter.

This method croaks on errors. If the registration was successful, it returns a hashref with the following subkeys:

signature_count

The new signature count, to be updated in the Relying Party's database

convert_raw_ecc_to_cose

my $cose_b64 = Authen::WebAuthn::convert_raw_ecc_to_cose($u2f_b64);

This method takes the base64url-encoded raw ECC key (U2F format) and converts it to a base64url-encoded COSE representation. It can be useful for converting existing U2F device registration to WebAuthen device registrations in your Relying Party.

CAVEAT

This module only supports the "None" attestation type at the moment, which means Relying Parties cannot have a strong guarantee of the authenticator's security properties. This makes it possible for users to register weak authenticators.

Because of that, is it not recommended to use this module in passwordless authentication scenarios. However, it should be good enough for using security keys as a second factor.

This limitation may be addressed in a future version.

SEE ALSO

W3C Web Authentication specification
FIDO::Raw

A library with a similar purpose, based on Yubico's libfido2

Authen::U2F

A library for adding U2F support to server applications

Crypt::U2F::Server

A library for adding U2F support to server applications, based on Yubico's libu2f-server

AUTHOR

Maxime Besson <mbesson@cpan.org>

COPYRIGHT AND LICENSE

This software is copyright (c) 2022 by Maxime Besson.

This is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the same terms as the Perl 5 programming language system itself.