Security Advisories (2)
CVE-2026-64193 (2026-07-20)

Net::DNS versions through 1.55 for Perl allow remote execution injection via EDNS EXTENDED ERROR. Net::DNS::RR::OPT::EXTENDED_ERROR::_decompose parses the EXTRA-TEXT field of an EDNS EXTENDED-ERROR option (RFC 8914) by tokenising the raw bytes and passing the result to Perl's eval. There is some escaping done for $ and @, but not for backticks. This can be exploited for command execution if $pkt->edns->option('EXTENDED-ERROR') is called in array context, for example with a payload of {0:`"<command>"`} in EXTRA-TEXT.

CVE-2026-64194 (2026-07-20)

Net::DNS versions through 1.55 for Perl allow Denial of Service via deep DNS compression pointer chains. Net::DNS::DomainName::decode follows RFC 1035 compression pointers by recursing into itself with no depth limit. It is possible to construct a name which saturates the call stack (at least with larger TCP responses), leading to a potential Denial of Service. The guard `$link < $offset` prevents forward and circular chains, but still allows arbitrarily long backward chains. The per-offset cache (`$cache`) is populated at the start of each call and short-circuits only re-traverses of the same offset - the initial descent through a fresh chain still recurses at full depth. A crafted packet can chain two-byte compression pointers so that each one points two bytes earlier than the previous, producing a chain length of `offset / 2`. For the 14-bit pointer field (max offset 16383) this gives up to ~8191 recursive frames. For a TCP DNS message the limit is the 16-bit length field (~32767 frames). Perl's default C stack handles only a few thousand frames; beyond that the process receives SIGSEGV or similar, which is a denial-of-service for any application parsing untrusted DNS data. The vulnerability is triggered by `Net::DNS::Packet->new(\$wire)` i.e. any point where the library decodes a DNS message from the network.

NAME

Net::DNS::RR::IPSECKEY - DNS IPSECKEY resource record

SYNOPSIS

use Net::DNS::RR;

DESCRIPTION

CLASS for the IPSECKEY RR.

METHODS

In addition to the regular methods

algorithm

Returns the RR's algorithm field in decimal representation

1 = RSA
2 = DSA

precedence

Returns the presedence

gatetype

Returns the gatetype.

0  "No gateway is present.",
1  "A 4-byte IPv4 address is present.",
2  "A 16-byte IPv6 address is present.",
3  "A wire-encoded domain name is present.",

gateway

Returns the gateway in the relevant string notation.

pubkey

Returns the public key in base64 notation

pubbin

Returns the binary public key material in a string.

TODO

Check on validity of algorithm and gatetype.

COPYRIGHT

Copyright (c) 2007 NLnet LAbs, Olaf Kolkman.

"All rights reserved, This program is free software; you may redistribute it and/or modify it under the same terms as Perl itself.

SEE ALSO

perl(1), Net::DNS, Net::DNS::Resolver, Net::DNS::Packet, Net::DNS::Header, Net::DNS::Question, Net::DNS::RR, draft-ietf-dnssext-delegation-signer