Security Advisories (1)
CVE-2026-15534 (2026-08-09)

Perl versions through 5.45.1 have out-of-bounds heap reads and writes during regular expression matching via an undersized superlinear cache in S_regmatch. The regex engine's superlinear cache holds one bit per subject position for each participating WHILEM node, so the bit count is the subject length plus one times the number of nodes. Nothing checks that product for positive overflow of the signed 32-bit count: a 286331153 byte subject matched against a pattern with 15 participating nodes stores the count as 14, leaving a two byte cache. The cache is then indexed from the real match position and node number, so reads go past the end of the allocation, and on failure CACHEsayNO sets a bit past it. A caller that matches an attacker controlled subject of this size against a pattern of this shape can crash the process or corrupt heap memory.

This is a macro that evaluates to a string constant of the UTF-8 bytes that define the Unicode BYTE ORDER MARK (U+FEFF) for the platform that perl is compiled on. This allows code to use a mnemonic for this character that works on both ASCII and EBCDIC platforms. sizeof(BOM_UTF8) - 1 can be used to get its length in bytes.

This is a macro that evaluates to a string constant of the UTF-8 bytes that define the Unicode REPLACEMENT CHARACTER (U+FFFD) for the platform that perl is compiled on. This allows code to use a mnemonic for this character that works on both ASCII and EBCDIC platforms. sizeof(REPLACEMENT_CHARACTER_UTF8) - 1 can be used to get its length in bytes.