perltidy through 20160302, as used by perlcritic, check-all-the-things, and other software, relies on the current working directory for certain output files and does not have a symlink-attack protection mechanism, which allows local users to overwrite arbitrary files by creating a symlink, as demonstrated by creating a perltidy.ERR symlink that the victim cannot delete.

• https://bugs.debian.org/862667

The make_temporary_filename function in perltidy 20120701-1 and earlier allows local users to obtain sensitive information or write to arbitrary files via a symlink attack, related to use of the tmpnam function.

• http://lists.fedoraproject.org/pipermail/package-announce/2014-March/130464.html
• http://lists.fedoraproject.org/pipermail/package-announce/2014-March/130479.html
• http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2014/03/09/1
• http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/66139
• https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1074720
• https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/92104
• https://github.com/perltidy/perltidy/issues/193