HTTP::Session2 versions through 1.09 for Perl does not validate the format of user provided session ids, enabling code injection or other impact depending on session backend. For example, if an application uses memcached for session storage, then it may be possible for a remote attacker to inject memcached commands in the session id value.

• https://github.com/tokuhirom/HTTP-Session2/commit/813838f6d08034b6a265a70e53b59b941b5d3e6d.patch
• https://metacpan.org/release/TOKUHIROM/HTTP-Session2-1.10/source/Changes
• https://metacpan.org/pod/Cache::Memcached::Fast::Safe

HTTP::Session2 versions before 1.12 for Perl for Perl may generate weak session ids using the rand() function. The HTTP::Session2 session id generator returns a SHA-1 hash seeded with the built-in rand function, the epoch time, and the PID. The PID will come from a small set of numbers, and the epoch time may be guessed, if it is not leaked from the HTTP Date header. The built-in rand() function is unsuitable for cryptographic usage. HTTP::Session2 after version 1.02 will attempt to use the /dev/urandom device to generate a session id, but if the device is unavailable (for example, under Windows), then it will revert to the insecure method described above.

• https://metacpan.org/release/TOKUHIROM/HTTP-Session2-1.11/source/lib/HTTP/Session2/Random.pm#L35
• https://metacpan.org/release/TOKUHIROM/HTTP-Session2-1.01/source/lib/HTTP/Session2/ServerStore.pm#L68
• https://metacpan.org/release/TOKUHIROM/HTTP-Session2-1.12/changes
• https://github.com/tokuhirom/HTTP-Session2/commit/9cfde4d7e0965172aef5dcfa3b03bb48df93e636.patch