/ 
perl-5.23.2
⭐ Starred 2013
/ TAP::Parser::IteratorFactory
Security Advisories (19)
CVE-2016-6185 (2016-08-02)

The XSLoader::load method in XSLoader in Perl does not properly locate .so files when called in a string eval, which might allow local users to execute arbitrary code via a Trojan horse library under the current working directory.

CVE-2020-12723 (2020-06-05)

regcomp.c in Perl before 5.30.3 allows a buffer overflow via a crafted regular expression because of recursive S_study_chunk calls.

CVE-2020-10878 (2020-06-05)

Perl before 5.30.3 has an integer overflow related to mishandling of a "PL_regkind[OP(n)] == NOTHING" situation. A crafted regular expression could lead to malformed bytecode with a possibility of instruction injection.

CVE-2020-10543 (2020-06-05)

Perl before 5.30.3 on 32-bit platforms allows a heap-based buffer overflow because nested regular expression quantifiers have an integer overflow.

CVE-2018-6798 (2018-04-17)

An issue was discovered in Perl 5.22 through 5.26. Matching a crafted locale dependent regular expression can cause a heap-based buffer over-read and potentially information disclosure.

CVE-2018-6797 (2018-04-17)

An issue was discovered in Perl 5.18 through 5.26. A crafted regular expression can cause a heap-based buffer overflow, with control over the bytes written.

CVE-2018-6913 (2018-04-17)

Heap-based buffer overflow in the pack function in Perl before 5.26.2 allows context-dependent attackers to execute arbitrary code via a large item count.

CVE-2018-18314 (2018-12-07)

Perl before 5.26.3 has a buffer overflow via a crafted regular expression that triggers invalid write operations.

CVE-2018-18313 (2018-12-07)

Perl before 5.26.3 has a buffer over-read via a crafted regular expression that triggers disclosure of sensitive information from process memory.

CVE-2018-18312 (2018-12-05)

Perl before 5.26.3 and 5.28.0 before 5.28.1 has a buffer overflow via a crafted regular expression that triggers invalid write operations.

CVE-2018-18311 (2018-12-07)

Perl before 5.26.3 and 5.28.x before 5.28.1 has a buffer overflow via a crafted regular expression that triggers invalid write operations.

CVE-2017-12883 (2017-09-19)

Buffer overflow in the S_grok_bslash_N function in regcomp.c in Perl 5 before 5.24.3-RC1 and 5.26.x before 5.26.1-RC1 allows remote attackers to disclose sensitive information or cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted regular expression with an invalid '\\N{U+...}' escape.

CVE-2017-12837 (2017-09-19)

Heap-based buffer overflow in the S_regatom function in regcomp.c in Perl 5 before 5.24.3-RC1 and 5.26.x before 5.26.1-RC1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds write) via a regular expression with a '\\N{}' escape and the case-insensitive modifier.

CVE-2015-8853 (2016-05-25)

The (1) S_reghop3, (2) S_reghop4, and (3) S_reghopmaybe3 functions in regexec.c in Perl before 5.24.0 allow context-dependent attackers to cause a denial of service (infinite loop) via crafted utf-8 data, as demonstrated by "a\x80."

CVE-2023-47100

In Perl before 5.38.2, S_parse_uniprop_string in regcomp.c can write to unallocated space because a property name associated with a \p{...} regular expression construct is mishandled. The earliest affected version is 5.30.0.

CVE-2024-56406 (2025-04-13)

A heap buffer overflow vulnerability was discovered in Perl. When there are non-ASCII bytes in the left-hand-side of the `tr` operator, `S_do_trans_invmap` can overflow the destination pointer `d`.    $ perl -e '$_ = "\x{FF}" x 1000000; tr/\xFF/\x{100}/;'    Segmentation fault (core dumped) It is believed that this vulnerability can enable Denial of Service and possibly Code Execution attacks on platforms that lack sufficient defenses.

CVE-2025-40909 (2025-05-30)

Perl threads have a working directory race condition where file operations may target unintended paths. If a directory handle is open at thread creation, the process-wide current working directory is temporarily changed in order to clone that handle for the new thread, which is visible from any third (or more) thread already running. This may lead to unintended operations such as loading code or accessing files from unexpected locations, which a local attacker may be able to exploit. The bug was introduced in commit 11a11ecf4bea72b17d250cfb43c897be1341861e and released in Perl version 5.13.6

CVE-2023-47039 (2023-10-30)

Perl for Windows relies on the system path environment variable to find the shell (cmd.exe). When running an executable which uses Windows Perl interpreter, Perl attempts to find and execute cmd.exe within the operating system. However, due to path search order issues, Perl initially looks for cmd.exe in the current working directory. An attacker with limited privileges can exploit this behavior by placing cmd.exe in locations with weak permissions, such as C:\ProgramData. By doing so, when an administrator attempts to use this executable from these compromised locations, arbitrary code can be executed.

CVE-2016-1238 (2016-08-02)

(1) cpan/Archive-Tar/bin/ptar, (2) cpan/Archive-Tar/bin/ptardiff, (3) cpan/Archive-Tar/bin/ptargrep, (4) cpan/CPAN/scripts/cpan, (5) cpan/Digest-SHA/shasum, (6) cpan/Encode/bin/enc2xs, (7) cpan/Encode/bin/encguess, (8) cpan/Encode/bin/piconv, (9) cpan/Encode/bin/ucmlint, (10) cpan/Encode/bin/unidump, (11) cpan/ExtUtils-MakeMaker/bin/instmodsh, (12) cpan/IO-Compress/bin/zipdetails, (13) cpan/JSON-PP/bin/json_pp, (14) cpan/Test-Harness/bin/prove, (15) dist/ExtUtils-ParseXS/lib/ExtUtils/xsubpp, (16) dist/Module-CoreList/corelist, (17) ext/Pod-Html/bin/pod2html, (18) utils/c2ph.PL, (19) utils/h2ph.PL, (20) utils/h2xs.PL, (21) utils/libnetcfg.PL, (22) utils/perlbug.PL, (23) utils/perldoc.PL, (24) utils/perlivp.PL, and (25) utils/splain.PL in Perl 5.x before 5.22.3-RC2 and 5.24 before 5.24.1-RC2 do not properly remove . (period) characters from the end of the includes directory array, which might allow local users to gain privileges via a Trojan horse module under the current working directory.

NAME

TAP::Parser::IteratorFactory - Figures out which SourceHandler objects to use for a given Source

VERSION

Version 3.35

SYNOPSIS

use TAP::Parser::IteratorFactory;
my $factory = TAP::Parser::IteratorFactory->new({ %config });
my $iterator  = $factory->make_iterator( $filename );

DESCRIPTION

This is a factory class that takes a TAP::Parser::Source and runs it through all the registered TAP::Parser::SourceHandlers to see which one should handle the source.

If you're a plugin author, you'll be interested in how to "register_handler"s, how "detect_source" works.

METHODS

Class Methods

new

Creates a new factory class:

my $sf = TAP::Parser::IteratorFactory->new( $config );

$config is optional. If given, sets "config" and calls "load_handlers".

register_handler

Registers a new TAP::Parser::SourceHandler with this factory.

__PACKAGE__->register_handler( $handler_class );

handlers

List of handlers that have been registered.

Instance Methods

config

my $cfg = $sf->config;
$sf->config({ Perl => { %config } });

Chaining getter/setter for the configuration of the available source handlers. This is a hashref keyed on handler class whose values contain config to be passed onto the handlers during detection & creation. Class names may be fully qualified or abbreviated, eg:

# these are equivalent
$sf->config({ 'TAP::Parser::SourceHandler::Perl' => { %config } });
$sf->config({ 'Perl' => { %config } });

load_handlers

$sf->load_handlers;

Loads the handler classes defined in "config". For example, given a config:

$sf->config({
  MySourceHandler => { some => 'config' },
});

load_handlers will attempt to load the MySourceHandler class by looking in @INC for it in this order:

TAP::Parser::SourceHandler::MySourceHandler
MySourceHandler

croaks on error.

make_iterator

my $iterator = $src_factory->make_iterator( $source );

Given a TAP::Parser::Source, finds the most suitable TAP::Parser::SourceHandler to use to create a TAP::Parser::Iterator (see "detect_source"). Dies on error.

detect_source

Given a TAP::Parser::Source, detects what kind of source it is and returns one TAP::Parser::SourceHandler (the most confident one). Dies on error.

The detection algorithm works something like this:

for (@registered_handlers) {
  # ask them how confident they are about handling this source
  $confidence{$handler} = $handler->can_handle( $source )
}
# choose the most confident handler

Ties are handled by choosing the first handler.

SUBCLASSING

Please see "SUBCLASSING" in TAP::Parser for a subclassing overview.

Example

If we've done things right, you'll probably want to write a new source, rather than sub-classing this (see TAP::Parser::SourceHandler for that).

But in case you find the need to...

package MyIteratorFactory;

use strict;

use base 'TAP::Parser::IteratorFactory';

# override source detection algorithm
sub detect_source {
  my ($self, $raw_source_ref, $meta) = @_;
  # do detective work, using $meta and whatever else...
}

1;

AUTHORS

Steve Purkis

ATTRIBUTION

Originally ripped off from Test::Harness.

Moved out of TAP::Parser & converted to a factory class to support extensible TAP source detective work by Steve Purkis.

SEE ALSO

TAP::Object, TAP::Parser, TAP::Parser::SourceHandler, TAP::Parser::SourceHandler::File, TAP::Parser::SourceHandler::Perl, TAP::Parser::SourceHandler::RawTAP, TAP::Parser::SourceHandler::Handle, TAP::Parser::SourceHandler::Executable