Security Advisories (12)
CVE-2024-56406 (2025-04-13)

A heap buffer overflow vulnerability was discovered in Perl. Release branches 5.34, 5.36, 5.38 and 5.40 are affected, including development versions from 5.33.1 through 5.41.10. When there are non-ASCII bytes in the left-hand-side of the `tr` operator, `S_do_trans_invmap` can overflow the destination pointer `d`.    $ perl -e '$_ = "\x{FF}" x 1000000; tr/\xFF/\x{100}/;'    Segmentation fault (core dumped) It is believed that this vulnerability can enable Denial of Service and possibly Code Execution attacks on platforms that lack sufficient defenses.

CVE-2022-48522 (2023-08-22)

In Perl 5.34.0, function S_find_uninit_var in sv.c has a stack-based crash that can lead to remote code execution or local privilege escalation.

CVE-2023-47038 (2023-10-30)

A crafted regular expression when compiled by perl 5.30.0 through 5.38.0 can cause a one attacker controlled byte buffer overflow in a heap allocated buffer

CVE-2026-13221 (2026-07-13)

Perl versions through 5.43.9 produce silently incorrect regular expression matches when an alternation of more than 65535 fixed string branches is compiled into a trie in Perl_study_chunk. When such branches are combined into a trie, the delta between the first branch and the shared tail is stored in a 16-bit field. A branch count above 65535 overflows the field, and the trie's match decision table is truncated with no warning or error. A pattern of this shape produces false positive matches (matching strings it should not) and false negative matches (failing to match strings it should). When such a pattern gates an access or filtering decision, the result is wrong.

CVE-2026-8376 (2026-05-25)

Perl versions through 5.43.10 have a heap buffer overflow when compiling regular expressions with a repeated fixed string on 32-bit builds. Perl_study_chunk in regcomp_study.c checked the size of the joined substring buffer in characters rather than bytes. For a quantified fixed substring with a large minimum count, the byte length mincount * l could overflow SSize_t, producing an undersized SvGROW allocation; the subsequent copy writes past the end of the buffer. A caller that compiles an attacker-controlled regular expression on a 32-bit perl build triggers a heap buffer overflow at compile time.

CVE-2026-19487 (2026-08-13)

Perl versions from 5.9.4 before 5.41.9 produce incorrect regular expression match results when a stale failure flag ends the Aho-Corasick prescan early in S_find_byclass. The prescan walks the subject for positions where the full pattern could match, and the engine tries it from the leftmost one recorded. A failing transition sets the failed flag, and a later successful transition does not clear it, so the prescan reads the stale flag as a failure and stops before it can record a candidate that starts earlier. It takes a subject where one candidate is recorded and a later character then forces a fallback through a fail link that succeeds. Example: "ABCDE" =~ m/ABCF|BCDE|C/; # matches C at offset 2, not BCDE "ABCDE" =~ m/ABCF|BCDE|C(G)/; # no match, BCDE missed An alternation like this can miss input it should match, or match it on the wrong branch, so an access or filtering decision made from the result can be wrong.

CVE-2026-4176 (2026-03-29)

Perl versions from 5.9.4 before 5.40.4-RC1, from 5.41.0 before 5.42.2-RC1, from 5.43.0 before 5.43.9 contain a vulnerable version of Compress::Raw::Zlib. Compress::Raw::Zlib is included in the Perl package as a dual-life core module, and is vulnerable to CVE-2026-3381 due to a vendored version of zlib which has several vulnerabilities, including CVE-2026-27171. The bundled Compress::Raw::Zlib was updated to version 2.221 in Perl blead commit c75ae9cc164205e1b6d6dbd57bd2c65c8593fe94.

CVE-2026-15534 (2026-08-09)

Perl versions through 5.45.1 have out-of-bounds heap reads and writes during regular expression matching via an undersized superlinear cache in S_regmatch. The regex engine's superlinear cache holds one bit per subject position for each participating WHILEM node, so the bit count is the subject length plus one times the number of nodes. Nothing checks that product for positive overflow of the signed 32-bit count: a 286331153 byte subject matched against a pattern with 15 participating nodes stores the count as 14, leaving a two byte cache. The cache is then indexed from the real match position and node number, so reads go past the end of the allocation, and on failure CACHEsayNO sets a bit past it. A caller that matches an attacker controlled subject of this size against a pattern of this shape can crash the process or corrupt heap memory.

CVE-2026-57432 (2026-07-13)

Perl versions through 5.43.10 have an integer overflow in S_measure_struct leading to an out-of-bounds heap read in pack and unpack. S_measure_struct adds each item's size times its repeat count to a running total with no overflow check, so a large repeat count in a pack or unpack template wraps the signed SSize_t total negative. The @, X, and x position codes then guard their moves with a signed length comparison that passes when the length is negative, advancing the buffer pointer out of bounds. A template derived from untrusted input can read heap memory past the buffer and return it to the caller.

CVE-2025-40909 (2025-05-30)

Perl threads have a working directory race condition where file operations may target unintended paths. If a directory handle is open at thread creation, the process-wide current working directory is temporarily changed in order to clone that handle for the new thread, which is visible from any third (or more) thread already running. This may lead to unintended operations such as loading code or accessing files from unexpected locations, which a local attacker may be able to exploit. The bug was introduced in commit 11a11ecf4bea72b17d250cfb43c897be1341861e and released in Perl version 5.13.6

CVE-2023-47039 (2023-10-30)

Perl for Windows relies on the system path environment variable to find the shell (cmd.exe). When running an executable which uses Windows Perl interpreter, Perl attempts to find and execute cmd.exe within the operating system. However, due to path search order issues, Perl initially looks for cmd.exe in the current working directory. An attacker with limited privileges can exploit this behavior by placing cmd.exe in locations with weak permissions, such as C:\ProgramData. By doing so, when an administrator attempts to use this executable from these compromised locations, arbitrary code can be executed.

CVE-2023-47100

In Perl before 5.38.2, S_parse_uniprop_string in regcomp.c can write to unallocated space because a property name associated with a \p{...} regular expression construct is mishandled. The earliest affected version is 5.30.0.

NAME

zipdetails - display the internal structure of zip files

SYNOPSIS

zipdetails [-v][--scan] zipfile.zip
zipdetails -h
zipdetails --version

DESCRIPTION

Zipdetails displays information about the internal record structure of zip files. It is not concerned with displaying any details of the compressed data stored in the zip file.

The program assumes prior understanding of the internal structure of a Zip file. You should have a copy of the Zip APPNOTE file at hand to help understand the output from this program ("SEE ALSO" for details).

Default Behaviour

By default the program expects to be given a well-formed zip file. It will navigate the Zip file by first parsing the zip central directory at the end of the file. If that is found, it will then walk through the zip records starting at the beginning of the file. Any badly formed zip data structures encountered are likely to terminate the program.

If the program finds any structural problems with the zip file it will print a summary at the end of the output report. The set of error cases reported is very much a work in progress, so don't rely on this feature to find all the possible errors in a zip file. If you have suggestions for use-cases where this could be enhanced please consider creating an enhancement request (see "SUPPORT").

Scan-Mode

If you do have a potentially corrupt zip file, particulatly where the central directory at the end of the file is absent/incomplete, you can try usng the --scan option to search for zip records that are still present.

When Scan-mode is enabled, the program will walk the zip file from the start blindly looking for the 4-byte signatures that preceed each of the zip data structures. If it finds any of the recognised signatures it will attempt to dump the associated zip record. For very large zip files, this operation can take a long time to run.

Note that the 4-byte signatures used in zip files can sometimes match with random data stored in the zip file, so care is needed interpreting the results.

OPTIONS

-h

Display help

--scan

Walk the zip file loking for possible zip records. Can be error-prone. See "Scan-Mode"

-v

Enable Verbose mode. See "Verbose Output".

--version

Display version number of the program and exit.

Default Output

By default zipdetails will output the details of the zip file in three columns.

Column 1

This contains the offset from the start of the file in hex.

Column 2

This contains a textual description of the field.

Column 3

If the field contains a numeric value it will be displayed in hex. Zip stores most numbers in little-endian format - the value displayed will have the little-endian encoding removed.

Next, is an optional description of what the value means.

Verbose Output

If the -v option is present, column 1 is expanded to include

  • The offset from the start of the file in hex.

  • The length of the field in hex.

  • A hex dump of the bytes in field in the order they are stored in the zip file.

LIMITATIONS

The following zip file features are not supported by this program:

  • Multi-part archives.

  • The strong encryption features defined in the "APPNOTE" document.

TODO

Error handling is a work in progress. If the program encounters a problem reading a zip file it is likely to terminate with an unhelpful error message.

SUPPORT

General feedback/questions/bug reports should be sent to https://github.com/pmqs/IO-Compress/issues (preferred) or https://rt.cpan.org/Public/Dist/Display.html?Name=IO-Compress.

SEE ALSO

The primary reference for Zip files is the "APPNOTE" document available at http://www.pkware.com/documents/casestudies/APPNOTE.TXT.

An alternative reference is the Info-Zip appnote. This is available from ftp://ftp.info-zip.org/pub/infozip/doc/

The zipinfo program that comes with the info-zip distribution (http://www.info-zip.org/) can also display details of the structure of a zip file.

See also Archive::Zip::SimpleZip, IO::Compress::Zip, IO::Uncompress::Unzip.

AUTHOR

Paul Marquess pmqs@cpan.org.

COPYRIGHT

Copyright (c) 2011-2021 Paul Marquess. All rights reserved.

This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the same terms as Perl itself.