Archive::Tar versions before 3.08 for Perl extract symlinks with attacker controlled targets outside the extraction directory.
_make_special_file() passes the tar header's linkname to symlink() without validating it against absolute paths or .. segments. The secure-extract mode check that guards regular file extraction does not cover the symlink target.
A subsequent open through the extracted name reads or writes the attacker chosen path.
Archive::Tar versions before 3.08 for Perl extract hardlinks to attacker controlled paths outside the extraction directory.
_make_special_file() passes the tar header's linkname to link() without validating it against absolute paths or .. segments, creating a hardlink that shares the victim file's inode.
A subsequent write through the extracted name modifies the victim file, and the post-extraction chmod, chown, and utime block in _extract_file() (guarded only against symlinks via -l) applies the tar header's mode, owner, and timestamps to the shared inode during extraction alone.
Archive::Tar versions before 3.10 for Perl allow memory exhaustion via attacker controlled entry size field in tar header.
_read_tar() reads each entry's payload with $handle->read($$data, $block), where $block is derived from the entry's 12-byte size field in the tar header with no upper bound on that value.
A crafted header declaring a multi-gigabyte size causes Perl to allocate a scalar of that size.