Archive::Tar versions before 3.08 for Perl extract symlinks with attacker controlled targets outside the extraction directory. _make_special_file() passes the tar header's linkname to symlink() without validating it against absolute paths or .. segments. The secure-extract mode check that guards regular file extraction does not cover the symlink target. A subsequent open through the extracted name reads or writes the attacker chosen path.

• https://github.com/jib/archive-tar-new/commit/17c873492a05eddc0de18c1485e0b2cccd5a9158.patch
• https://metacpan.org/release/BINGOS/Archive-Tar-3.08/changes
• https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-42497

Archive::Tar versions before 3.08 for Perl extract hardlinks to attacker controlled paths outside the extraction directory. _make_special_file() passes the tar header's linkname to link() without validating it against absolute paths or .. segments, creating a hardlink that shares the victim file's inode. A subsequent write through the extracted name modifies the victim file, and the post-extraction chmod, chown, and utime block in _extract_file() (guarded only against symlinks via -l) applies the tar header's mode, owner, and timestamps to the shared inode during extraction alone.

• https://github.com/jib/archive-tar-new/commit/17c873492a05eddc0de18c1485e0b2cccd5a9158.patch
• https://metacpan.org/release/BINGOS/Archive-Tar-3.08/changes
• https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-42496

Archive::Tar versions before 3.10 for Perl allow memory exhaustion via attacker controlled entry size field in tar header. _read_tar() reads each entry's payload with $handle->read($$data, $block), where $block is derived from the entry's 12-byte size field in the tar header with no upper bound on that value. A crafted header declaring a multi-gigabyte size causes Perl to allocate a scalar of that size.

• https://github.com/jib/archive-tar-new/commit/f9af01426038e29d9578825a0cd3626946ab08c7.patch
• https://metacpan.org/release/BINGOS/Archive-Tar-3.10/changes