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Imager-0.93
⭐ Starred 27 / Imager::Regops
Security Advisories (6)
CVE-2016-1238 (2016-08-02)

Imager would search the default current directory entry in @INC when searching for file format support modules.

CPANSA-Imager-2014-01 (2014-01-03)

When drawing on an image with an alpha channel where the source minimum is greater than zero, Imager would read from beyond the end of a malloc() allocated buffer. In rare circumstances this could lead to some of the source image not being written to the target image, or possibly to a segmentation fault.

CVE-2024-53901 (2024-11-17)

"invalid next size" backtrace on use of trim on certain images

CVE-2026-8669 (2026-05-15)

Imager versions through 1.030 for Perl allow a heap out of bounds (OOB) write on crafted multi-frame GIF files. Imager::File::GIF's i_readgif_multi_low allocates a single per-row buffer GifRow sized for the GIF's global screen width 'SWidth' and reuses it across every image in the file. The page-match branch validates Image.Width + Image.Left > SWidth before each DGifGetLine write, but the parallel skip-image branch at imgif.c:790-805 calls DGifGetLine(GifFile, GifRow, Width) with no such check.

CVE-2026-13705 (2026-07-06)

Imager versions before 1.032 for Perl have a heap out-of-bounds read in the bundled Imager::File::SGI reader via a 16-bit RLE literal run in read_rgb_16_rle. read_rgb_16_rle guards each literal run with if (count > data_left), but count is a pixel count while every 16-bit sample consumes two bytes. The copy loop reads inp[0] * 256 + inp[1] and advances two bytes per pixel, so a run with data_left / 2 < count <= data_left passes the guard yet consumes 2 * count bytes and reads past the end of the buffer. The 8-bit path is unaffected because there one pixel is one byte. Reading a crafted SGI image through Imager->read triggers the over-read before the parser rejects the malformed image, which can crash the process.

CVE-2026-14454 (2026-07-08)

Imager versions before 1.033 for Perl treat unsigned EXIF IFD entry counts as signed. Imager mishandled large EXIF IFD entry count values, treating them as negative numbers. This could lead to an attempt to allocate a block nearly the size of the address space, which fails and kills the process. An attacker could craft an image with EXIF data that terminates a worker process.

NAME

Imager::Regops - generated information about the register based virtual machine

SYNOPSIS

use Imager::Regops;
$Imager::Regops::Attr{$opname}->{opcode} # opcode for given operator
$Imager::Regops::Attr{$opname}->{parms} # number of parameters
$Imager::Regops::Attr{$opname}->{types} # types of parameters
$Imager::Regops::Attr{$opname}->{func} # operator is a function
$Imager::Regops::Attr{$opname}->{result} # r for numeric, p for pixel result
$Imager::Regops::MaxOperands; # maximum number of operands

DESCRIPTION

This module is generated automatically from regmach.h so we don't need to maintain the same information in at least one extra place.

At least that's the idea.

AUTHOR

Tony Cook, tony@develop-help.com

SEE ALSO

perl(1), Imager(3), http://imager.perl.org/